University of Baltimore Law

ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law
All Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Scholarship

Fall 1998

Joint Defense Agreements and Disqualification of
Co-Defendant's Counsel,
Arnold Rochvarg
University of Baltimore School of Law, arochvarg@ubalt.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/all_fac
Part of the Legal Profession Commons
Recommended Citation
Joint Defense Agreements and Disqualification of Co-Defendant's Counsel, 22 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 311 (1998)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more
information, please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

Joint Defense Agreements
and Disqualification of
Co-Defendant's Counsel
Arnold Rochvargt

I. Introduction
In civil cases involving more than one defendant, the defendants

typically work together to coordinate their defense strategy.! This involvement could be most easily accomplished ifthe multiple defendants
were represented by one attorney.2 Often this type of representation is
not possible, however, because conflicts may exist between the defendants. 3 Even if separate counsel were not required, a defendant would
often prefer to have his own attorney rather than share one with another
defendant. Therefore, in order to coordinate their defenses, joint defendants represented by separate attorneys often enter into joint defense
agreements.
The areas typically covered by joint defense agreements include
exchanging information about the merits ofthe case, dividing responsibility for pre-trial motions and discovery, sharing costs of expert witnesses,
discussing strategies of defense, and exchanging legal memoranda. 4
t B.A. (1973), University of Pennsylvania; J.D. (1976) George Washington University. The author is currently a Professor at the University of Baltimore School of Law.
I See, e.g., The Corporate Counsel Section of the New York State Bar Ass 'n, Report
on Cost-Effective Management ofCorporate Litigation, 59 ALBANY L. REv. 263, 30812 (1995) [hereinafter Report]; Richard A. Horder, Case Management ofMass Tort
Litigation from the Perspective ofInside Counsel: What Clients Want in Preparation
and Trial ofa Toxic Tort Case (PLI Litig. & Administrative Practice Course Handbook,
1988).
2 See, e.g., Susan K. Rushing, Note, Separating the Joint Defense Doctrine from
the Attorney-Client Privilege, 68 TEXAS L. REv. 1273 (1990).
3 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983).
4 Deborah Stanville Bartel, Reconceptualizating the Joint Defense Doctrine, 65
FORDHAM L. REv. 871, 875-79 (1996); Rushing, supra note 2, at 1273; Report, supra
note 1, at 309.
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Althoughjoint defense agreements may appear to be part of a conspiracy
to thwart the integrity of litigation, in general, joint defense agreements
are well accepted as beneficial to both litigants and the system in general.
By pennitting parties to cooperate in their defenses, litigation becomes
more efficient. 5 Fuller infonnation is gathered more cheaply. 6 Inconsistent defenses that put defendants in an unfair position and that may
confuse the jury can be avoided. 7
Significant to the development and growth ofj oint defense agreements
has been the evidentiary joint defense privilege. s Under this privilege,
communications among defendants and their respective counsel are
protected from disclosure. 9 Ifthe privilege is to attach, the communication must be made in the course of the cooperative effort and intended
to further that effort.lo The evidentiary joint defense privilege is an
exception to the general rule that the attorney client privilege does not
apply when a privileged communication between a client and his attorney
is made in the presence of a third person. I I The joint defense privilege
grants an evidentiary privilege for communications from non-clients to
lawyers. 12 The joint defense privilege also protects matters that are
covered by the work product privilege and, in some respects, provides
protection beyond that granted by the traditional work product doctrine. 13
The evidentiary joint defense privilege, however, does not apply in
litigation between members of the joint defense. 14
The joint defense privilege has endured some scholarly review. 15 One
particular issue studied is what occurs in a criminal case when one co-

S

Bartel, supra note 4, at 882-83; Gerald Heller, Raising the Joint Defense Privilege,

FED. LAW., Jan. 1997, at 46.

Report, supra note 1, at 309.
7 Bartel, supra note 4, at 873, 881.
8 Heller, supra note 5, at 46.
9 !d.
10 ld. at 48.
Illd. at 46.

6

Rushing, supra note 2, at 1273.
Bartel, supra note 4, at 874.
14 Heller, supra note 5, at 48-49.
IS Bartel, supra note 4, at 871; Heller, supra note 5, at 46.

12

\3
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defendant decides to cooperate with the prosecution and testify against
his former co-defendants. 16 An issue that has received little commentary
is the issue of the disqualification of an attorney and that attorney's law
firm in separate litigation based on a motion by a member of a prior joint
defense agreement of which the attorney's former client was also a
member. Recently, various courts have addressed this issue.17 The
purpose ofthis Article is to review and analyze the cases that have dealt
with the issue of joint defense agreements and motions for disqualification of another member's attorney in subsequent cases. The goal of this
Article is to reach a better understanding ofthe present state ofthe law.
The Article then proposes an analysis for use in future cases.

II. Doctrinal Development
of the Joint Defense Privilege
The first case involving a member of a joint defense who sought to
disqualify an attorney of another joint defense member in subsequent
litigation was Wilson P. Abraham Construction Corp. v. Armco Steel
Corp., 18 which involved alleged antitrust violations in the steel industry.
In 1972, Whitlow Co., Inc. (Whitlow) was one of the targets of a federal
grand jury investigation of the trade practices ofthe rebar steel industry
in Texas. 19 Whitlow was represented by Stephen Susman ofthe Fulbright
& Jaworski law firm.20 After indictments were issued against various
steel companies, including Whitlow, Armco Steel Corp., The Ceco Corp.
and Laclede Steel Co., Susman, as counsel for Whitlow, met more than

16 See, e.g., Bartel, supra note 4, at 872; Heller, supra note S, at 48; Matthew D.
Forsgren, Note, The Outer Edge of the Envelope: Disqualification of White Collar
Criminal Defense Attorneys Under the Joint Defense Doctrine, 78 MINN. L. REv. 1219,
1222 (1994).
17 In 1988, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted that
disqualification motions were becoming more numerous because the changing nature
of the legal profession was presenting a greater number of potential conflicts. Manning
v. Waring, Cox,James, Sklar & Allen, 849 F.2d222, 224-2S (6thCir. 1988). Thecourt
noted that firms were employing hundreds oflawyers, and that specialists were being
concentrated under fewer roofs. /d. at 224.
18 SS9 F.2d 2S0 (Sth Cir. 1977).
19 Abraham Const. Corp., SS9 F.2d at 2S1.
20/d.
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once with representatives of the other defendants in order to develop a
cooperative defense plan. 21 At the same time as the Texas investigation,
a related but separate antitrust investigation of the steel industry was
taking place in Louisiana, which ultimately led to indictments and a civil
action in Louisiana. 22 Whitlow was not a defendant in the Louisiana
actions, but several ofthe defendants in the Texas cases, namely Annco,
Ceco and Laclede, were defendants in the Louisiana case. 23
WilsonP. Abraham Construction Corp. (Abraham Construction) was
a plaintiff in the Louisiana ci viI action. 24 Members ofthe Louisiana steel
industry that were involved in the Texas litigation objected when
Abraham Construction sought to hire Susman as co-counse1. 25 The
Louisiana steel industry defendants argued that Susman should be
disqualified from representing Abraham Construction in its civil suit
against them in Louisiana because Susman had been privy to confidential
information as part of the cooperative defense discussions in Texas. 26
The main issue was whether someone who was never a client of an
attorney could seek disqualification of that attorney.27
The Fifth Circuit noted that ifthe motion had been filed by a former
client, disqualification would be required based solely on proof that a
substantial relationship existed between the two matters. 28 No proof
would be required that any confidential information had been disclosed,
nor that any confidential information would be used to the detriment of
the attorney's former client. 29 The Fifth Circuit noted, however, that these
rules did not apply when a non-client sought disqualification. 30

21 [d. A civil suit was also filed in Texas involving the same antitrust issues which
the grand jury had investigated. [d. at 252. Susman was also the lawyer for Whitlow
in this civil case; however, Susman denied doing anything of substance in defense of
the civil case. [d.
22 [d. at 252.

23

[d.

Abraham Constr. Corp., 559 F.2d 250.
2S !d. at 252.
26 [d.
24

27

28
29

30

!d. at 253 ..
!d. at 252.

Abraham Constr. Corp., 559 F.2d at 252.
!d. at 253.
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The Fifth Circuit did not state, however, that a disqualification motion
could not be filed by a person who was never a client of the attorney in
question. 31 Rather, the court held that when information not intended for
unlimited pUblication or use is exchanged between co-defendants and
their attorneys, an attorney who has received such information owes a
fiduciary duty to non-client co-defendants not to use it in a later representation of another client to the detriment of his former client's co-defendants. 32 When a disqualification motion is filed by a party who was not
a former client ofthe attorney whose disqualification is sought, the Fifth
Circuit places the burden of proof on the moving party to show that
confidential information had been disclosed to the attorney during an
earlier cooperative defense. 33 InAbraham Construction Corp., a remand
was necessary to determine whether Susman had in fact received
confidential information from Whitlow's Texas co-defendants. 34 Upon
remand, the district court found that Susman had not been privy to
confidential information from any of the co-defendants in the Texas
antitrust cases, and thus, Susman was not disqualified. 3s
The Fifth Circuit's opinion in Abraham Construction Corp. is
significant for a few reasons. First, it recognized the right of a non-client
to seek disqualification of an attorney absent an express joint defense
agreement among the co-defendants and their attorneys.36 Second,
although recognizing the non-client's right to seek disqualification, the
Fifth Circuit refused to equate the non-client' s rights with those of actual
former clients. 37 Unlike the former client situation, the court required
proofby the non-client moving party of actual disclosure of confidential
information before disqualification would be ordered. 38

31

See id.

32

[d.

33/d.

Abraham Constr. Corp., 559 F.2d at 253.
35 Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 1979 WL 1614, * 1 (E.D.
La. Mar. 28, 1979).
36 See Abraham Constr. Corp., 559 F.2d at 252.
37 [d. at 253.
34

38

[d.
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About the same time the Fifth Circuit was deciding the disqualification
motion inAbraham Construction Corp., the Eighth Circuit faced a similar
issue in Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil CO. 39 Fred Weber, Inc. (Weber)
brought a civil antitrust case against various oil companies, including
Shell Oil Co. and American Oil Co. 40 About ten years prior to this civil
litigation, in a previous criminal antitrust case, Weber's counsel, Lashly,
Caruthers, Thies, Rava & Hamel (Lashly), had also been counsel to codefendants of Amoco and Shell. 41 Amoco and Shell sought to disqualify
Lashly from representing Weber, alleging that members ofthe law firm
had access to confidential information obtained at meetings of codefendants' counsel that were held to discuss defense strategy during the
earlier criminallitigation. 42 Lashly replied that it never represented Shell
or Amoco; it never received confidential information from Shell or
Amoco; and that absent proofthat it had received confidential information
from Shell or Amoco, disqualification was not warranted. 43 The district
court judge ordered an in-camera inspection of the alleged confidential
information that Shell and Amoco had disclosed to members ofLashly
in the earlier criminal case. 44 Based upon this in-camera hearing, the
judge found that no confidential information had been exchanged, and
therefore he denied the motion to disqualify.45
The issue on appeal was whether a lawyer's representation of A, who
was also a co-defendant with B in a prior suit, disqualified the lawyer as
representative for C against B in a subsequent, related suit. 46 The court
identified the instant case as one of "first recorded impression.,>47 The
Eighth Circuit first considered Canon 4 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which concerns confidentiality.48 The court stated that
39

566 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1977) (overruled on other grounds; overruled as to order
denying disqualification motion being fmal and appealable).
40 Fred Weber, Inc., 566 F.2d at 605.
41/d.

42/d.

43Id.
44 Id.
45 Fred Weber, Inc., 566 F.2d at 605.
46Id. at 606.
47Id.
48 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1980) (providing that
"[a] lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a client").
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Canon 4 is limited to the duty a lawyer owes his client. Therefore, in
order to employ Canon 4 as a basis for an attorney's disqualification, the
moving party must have or have had an attorney-client relationship with
the attorney who is the target ofthe disqualification motion. 49 Because
no members ofLashly ''were engaged by, or advised or represented, Shell
or Amoco in the prior antitrust suit," Canon 4 was "inapplicable.,,5o
The Eighth Circuit also considered Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides for an injunction against conduct
that creates an appearance of impropriety. 51 The court stated the issue
as whether a member of the public or the bar would see impropriety in
the mere representation of C against B by a lawyer who had represented
B 's co-defendant in a prior related suit. 52 The court's response was : "We
think not" because "the public and the bar are aware that particular
lawyers have specialized in certain areas . . . and that their number is
limited within specific geographical limits. ,,53 The court believed that
"[i]t would be neither surprising nor unexpected that the same lawyer
would appear for plaintiffs and defendants, and that a present adverse
party may have been on the other side in a prior case. ,,54 It also believed
that "[t]o hold that every representation against a former client's codefendant in a related matter raises an appearance of impropriety" would
unnecessarily restrict the choice of counsel available to litigants.,,55
The Eighth Circuit also rejected the application of an irrebuttable
presumption of shared confidences from B to A's lawyers. 56 The court
was unwilling to presume a "lack of integrity" in A's lawyer knowingly
accepting representation against a party from whom or about whom
confidential information had been obtained. 57 The proper approach to
Canon 9's appearance of impropriety was to determine whether A's
Fred Weber, Inc., 566 F.2d at 607-08.
50ld. at 608.
51 Canon 9 provides: "A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional
impropriety." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1980).
52 Fred Weber, Inc., 566 F.2d at 609.
531d.
541d.
551d.
561d.
49

57

Fred Weber, Inc., 566 F.2d at 609.
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counsel, Lashly, had actually obtained confidential information while
representing a co-defendant of Shell or Amoco in the prior litigation. 58
Shell and Amoco had the burden of showing an actual imparting of
information. 59 Because the in-camera submissions failed to demonstrate
that confidential information had been disclosed to members ofLashly,
disqualification was not ordered. 60
A few points are worth noting about the Fred Weber, Inc. opinion.
First, the court rejected using the ethical obligation of confidentiality as
the basis of possible disqualification, relying instead on the appearance
of impropriety.61 Unlike the Fifth Circuit in Wilson P. Abraham
Construction Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp.,62 the Eighth Circuit did not
view the relevant issue as one involving an attorney's fiduciary duty to
a non-client, but rather viewed the matter from the perspective ofwhether
the public or the bar would see impropriety in the representation. 63
Although taking a different approach, the Eighth Circuit's answer to the
issue presented was identical to that of the Fifth Circuit's opinion in
Abraham Construction COrp.64 The court's answer was that disqualification was warranted only ifthe moving party demonstrated that confidential information had actually been transmitted to the lawyer from the
lawyer's former client's co-defendant. 65 Both courts rejected any presumption of shared confidences. 66
The next significant case, Kaskie v. Celotex Corp, was decided by a
federal district judge in Illinois in 1985. 67 Felix Kaskie sued Atchinson,
Topeka and Santa Fe Railway (Railway) and various asbestos manufacturers, including Celotex, claiming to have suffered from exposure to

S8Id.
s9Id. at 610.
60 Id.
61/d. at 609.
62

559 F.2d 250 (5th CiT. 1977).
Fred Weber, Inc., 566 F.2d at 609.
64 559 F.2d at 250; see also Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804 (5th
Cir. 1976).
6S Fred Weber, Inc., 566 F.2d at 609.
66Id.
63

067

618 F. Supp. 696 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
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asbestos while working as a Railway employee. 68 A few years prior to
Kaskie's lawsuit, various asbestos manufacturers, including Celotex, and
various asbestos distributors had formed an Asbestos Defense Group
(ADG) in response to asbestos litigation across the country.69 The
purpose of this ADG was to coordinate discovery, plan strategy, and
facilitate settlements. 7o
In response to Kaskie' s complaint, Railway filed a cross-claim against
the asbestos manufacturer defendants. 71 Railway hired the law firm of
Jacobs, Williams and Montgomery (JWM) as additional counsel to pursue
this cross-claim. 72 However, JWM had represented Standard Asbestos,
an asbestos manufacturer. 73 Standard was not a defendant in the Kaskie
case, but it was amemberofthe ADG. 74 As Standard's counsel in other
asbestos cases, JWM had attended meetings ofthe ADG with companies
that were defendants in Kaskie's lawsuit. 75 Celotex moved to disqualify
JWM as counsel for Railway, alleging that confidential information,
which JWM could now use in litigating Railway's cross-claim, had been
exchanged during the ADG meetings. 76 In asserting this claim, Celotex
relied on Canons 4 and 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.77
The judge first reasoned that "[i]fCanon 4 were read literally, Celotex
might not have standing to asset this violation because [Celotex] ha[d]
never been a client of [JWM].,,78 However, the judge declined to read
Canon 4 as narrowly and held that Celotex did have standing to seek
disqualification of Railway's attorney under Canon 4 because Celotex
was claiming a breach of confidential information. 79 Additionally, Celotex
Kaskie, 618 F. Supp. at 697.
[d.
70 [d.
71 [d.
72 [d.
68

69

73

Kaskie, 618 F. Supp. at 697.

74

[d.

7S /d.

at 698.

[d.
77 [d.
76

78

Kaskie, 618 F. Supp. at 698.

79/d.
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had standing under Canon 9 because Canon 9's purpose was to ensure
public confidence in the legal profession, and create a "zone of interest"
as broad, ifnot broader, than Canon 4. 80 The judge's decision was influenced by the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 81
which involved members of a trade association providing confidential
information to the trade association's attorneys. The district court judge
in Kaslde interpreted Westinghouse to have broadened the concept of
client "to include a relationship between an attorney and another entity
(person or corporation) that involves a fiduciary obligation resulting from
'the nature of the work performed and the circumstances under which
confidential information is divulged. ",82
After ruling that Celotex had standing to seek JWM' s disqualification,
the next issue was what would warrant JWM's disqualification. 83 The
court held that the irrebuttable presumption of shared confidences, which
applied when a law firm switched sides to represent an adversary of a
former client, only "makes sense" when an actual attorney-client relationship exists. 84 However, no irrebuttable presumption is found in this
co-defendant context because these co-defendants are not likely "to bare
their souls to each other. ,,85 The better approach in the co-defendant
situation would be to apply a rebuttable presumption of shared confidences. 86 In this regard, the judge ruled that JWM had an obligation to
"show clearly and persuasively that it did not receive any confidences
from Celotex during the ADG meetings,,87 ifit wanted to avoid disqualification in Kaskie's case. Because JWM only presented one affidavit
denying receipt of confidential information, the court found JWM's
showing to be insufficient to rebut the presumption of shared confi-

80

Id. at 698-99.

580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978).
82 Kaskie, 618 F. Supp. at 698; see Westinghouse, 580 F.2d at 1320.
83 Kaskie, 618 F. Supp. at 699.
84 Id.
8S-Jd.
81

86

Id.

87

Id. at 700.
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dences. 88 However, the law firm had been "resting on the hope that
Celotex would have the burden to prove confidential information was
exchanged" (a position now rejected by the district judge); as a result,
JWM was given another opportunity to prove that it had not received such
information. 89
The approach ofthe Kaskie court differs in a couple of respects from
the earlier approaches adopted by the Fifth and Eighth Circuits. First,
Kaskie held that a non-client could rely on the ethical obligation of
confidentiality found in Canon 4 ofthe Code ofProfessional Responsibility as a basis for disqualification of a joint defense member's attorney. 90
Second, although agreeing that an irrebuttable presumption of shared
confidences was inappropriate, the Kaskie court placed the burden of
proofon the law firm that was the subject ofthe disqualification motion
in order to show that confidential information had not been exchanged. 91
This aspect is different from the earlier cases that placed the burden of
proof on the moving party to show that such information had been
exchanged. 92
The next significant discussions regarding this issue occurred in 1995
when the American Bar Association Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (ABA) issued Ethics Opinion 95-395. 93 This
Opinion involved a lawyer who had represented one member of a joint
defense group and then, after changing law firms, was asked to represent
a new client against a different member of the original joint defense
groUp.94 The ABA Opinion first stated that the lawyer owed no ethical
responsibility under Rule 1.6 ofthe Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(Confidentiality of Information) to non-client members of the joint

88
89
90
91

Kaskie, 618 F. Supp. at 700.
!d.
Id. at 698.
[d. at 700.

92 See Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250 (5th
Cir. 1977); Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1977).
93 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-395 (1995)
[hereinafter ABA Opinion].
94Id.
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defense groUp.95 The lawyer's duty under Rule 1.6 applied only to the
lawyer's client. 96 Therefore, disclosure and use of any relevant confidential information would be ethically permissible if the former client
consented. The ABA Opinion noted, however, that ifthe former client
contractually agreed with the other members ofthe joint defense group
to preserve the confidentiality of the exchanged information, and the
former client then consented to the lawyer's use of the information,
although the lawyer would have satisfied his ethical obligation under Rule
1.6, the client could be held liable for breaching the confidentiality
agreement. 97 The ABA Opinion also rejected any duty of a lawyer to his
former client's co-defendants under Rule 1.9 of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct because in such a situation no attorney-client
relationship exists with the former client's co-defendants. 98 The ABA
Opinion continued, however, that although there was no duty of the
lawyer to the former client's co-defendants under the Model Rules of

95 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides in relevant part that "[a]
lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client
consents after consultation." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6
(1980) (amended 1995).
96 ABA Opinion, supra note 93.
97

[d.

98

!d. Rule 1.9 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides:

(a) A lawyer who has fonnerly represented a client in a matter shaH not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which
that person's interests are materialIy adverse to the interests of the fonner client
unless the fonner client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantialIy related matter in which a finn with which the lawyer fonnerly was associated
had previously represented a client
(I) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and
(2) about whom the lawyer had acquired infonnation protected by Rules 1.6
and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter; unless the fonner client consents after
consultation.
(c) A lawyer who has fonnerly represented a client in a matter or whose present
or fonner finn has fonnerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:
(I) use infonnation relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the
fonner client except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect
to a client, or when the infonnation has become generally known; or
(2) reveal infonnation relating to the representation except as Rule 1.6 or Ru Ie
3.3 would pennit or require with respect to a client.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 1.9 (1987) (amended 1995).
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Professional Conduct, the lawyer "almost surely has a fiduciary obligation
to the other members that might lead to his disqualification under case
law.,,99
In 1995 the Texas Court of Appeals decided Rio Hondo Implement
Co. v. Euresti. IOO George and Frances Nixon, d/b/a Nixon Farms, hired
Bruce Hodge to represent them in a lawsuit against Porteous Fasteners
and Rio Hondo Implement Co. (Rio Hondo) for damages resulting from
the alleged improper repair of farm equipment. 101 Anthony James
represented Porteous Fasteners. 102 Patricia Kelly represented Rio
Hondo. 103 Although Porteous Fasteners and Rio Hondo had cross actions
against each other, Kelly and James met to discuss trial strategy in the
Nixons' case against them. 104 Allegedly, at this meeting, confidential
documents were examined, and the attorneys jointly decided how to
present evidence of their affirmative defenses and how to use their
peremptory challenges. lOS Before trial, Porteous Fasteners settled with
the Nixons. ,06 After Porteous Fasteners settled, James (Porteous Fasteners's former lawyer) and Hodge (the Nixons' attorney) decided to become
partners. 107 Briefly after formation ofthe new partnership, Rio Hondo
moved to disqualify Hodge and the law firm of Hodge & James as the
attorneys for the Nixons. ,08 The motion was based upon Rio Hondo's
sharing of confidential information with James when he represented
Porteous Fasteners. 109 James denied that confidential information had

99 The ABA Opinion did not address whether the attorney would be in breach of
a duty to his client if the attorney asked for consent to permit disclosure. ABA Opinion,
supra note 93.
100 903 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. App. 1995).
101 Rio Hondo, 903 S.W.2d at 129. Rio Hondo made the repair. /d.
Porteous
Fasteners was an upstream supplier of the allegedly defective lockwashers installed by
Rio Hondo. [d.
102 [d.
103

[d.

/d. at 129.
lOS /d.

104

106
107

Rio Hondo, 903 S.W.2d at 130.
[d.

[d.
109 /d.
108
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been shared because the cross actions between Rio Hondo and Porteous
Fasteners had been serious: 10
The Texas appeals court first held that the Texas Disciplinary Rules
involving confidentiality I II or former client conflict of interest I 12 did not
address the issue presented. 113 The Texas court, however, relying on both
Wilson P. Abraham Construction Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp. 114 and Fred
Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil CO.,IIS held that, in order for Rio Hondo's
disqualification motion to be granted, Rio Hondo must prove that
confidential information had been shared with James while James was
Porteous Fasteners's attorney, and that the present matter was substantially related to the previous matter during which confidential information
had been exchanged. I 16 The Texas appeals court held that Rio Hondo had
not met its burden of proving that confidential information had been
exchanged. I 17
Although the Texas appeals court cited Abraham Construction Corp.
and Fred Weber, Inc.; the Rio Hondo holding appears narrower than the
holdings in those cases. 118 The court required the party moving for
disqualification to prove the exchange of confidential information and
that the two matters were substantially related. I 19
At about the same time the Texas appeals court decided Rio Hondo,
a federal district court in Texas decided Turner v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber CO. 120 Turner was a toxic tort case brought by past and present

\lOId.
III

TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.05.

112

TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.09.

113 Rio Hondo, 903 S.W.2d at 131. The court accepted the position that the Texas
Rules of Evidence recognized a joint defense privilege as part of the attorney-client
privilege, but rejected Rio Hondo's claim that the evidentiary privilege essentially
makes counsel for one defendant the counsel for all defendants with respect to confidential information obtained through a joint defense. Id.
\14559 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1977).

\IS

566 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1977).

See Rio Hondo, 903 S.W.2d at 132.
117 Id.
118Id.
9
\l /d.

116

120

896 F. Supp. 651 (E.D. Tex. 1995).
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employees ofthe Red River Army Depot alleging injuries resulting from
exposure to toxic fumes, steam, smoke and other toxic substances released
into the atmosphere from rubber products manufactured by various
defendants. 121 A few years earlier in Fleenor v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., other employees at the same army depot brought a similar suit
against rubber manufacturers Goodyear, Firestone, and Tocco, Inc. 122 The
defendants in Fleenor entered into a joint defense agreement in which
their defense lawyers "agreed to pool resources, divide work assignments,
and ... discuss defense strategy.,,123 Defense counsel in this case met
monthly at which time each participant would sign a confidentiality
agreement verifying that none ofthem had made any settlement with the
plaintiffs, and that any information exchanged was to be considered
confidential. 124 The law firm of Gooding and Dodson (G&D) represented
Tocco in the Fleenor case. 125
Monty Murry was a member ofG&D while G&D represented Tocco
in Fleenor. 126 Although Murry did some work for Tocco in the Fleenor
case, he never attended any of the joint defense meetings or signed any
of the confidentiality agreements, although he apparently did attend a
meeting with attorneys for the other defendants regarding discovery. 127
At this discovery meeting, the parties' counsel decided which attorney

122

Turner, 896 F. Supp. at 652.
!d.

123

!d. The joint defense agreement provided:

121

Each ofthe undersigned are attendees at the Joint Defense Counsel meeting referred
to above. Each of the undersigned represent that at the time of this meeting neither
they nor their clients have made any type of settlement with the Plaintiffs or any
other party or non-party to this matter and further represent that they have not made
any type of ... deal where they would share information disclosed in this meeting
to anyone other than their clients and those persons who are necessarily involved
in the defense of that client. It is understood that the communications which take
place today are intended to be confidential and are subject to any and all privileges
which are commonly referred to as the joint defense privileges, which privileges
may be raised by anyone or more of the undersigned and will be honored by all of
the undersigned.

Turner, 896 F. Supp. at 652 n.3.
124 Turner, 896 F. Supp. at 652.
125Id.
126

!d.

127

!d. at 652 n.2
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would argue at an upcoming hearing. 128 Before the Fleenor case was
resolved, Murry left G&D to become a founding member ofthe law firm,
Murry & Griffin (M&G).129 Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs in Turner
retained M&G.130 The original defendants in the Turner lawsuit included
not only Goodyear and Firestone, but also TOCCO.131 Shortly after the
filing ofthe complaint, however, Tocco was dismissed with prejudice. \32
Tocco subsequently agreed to waive any conflict it might have with
M&G's representation of the plaintiffs in Turner.133 Goodyear and
Firestone, however, sought M&G' s disqualification, arguing that Murry's
representation in Turner violated the conflict of interest rules ofthe Texas
Disciplinary Rules. 134 Murry was also presumed to have gained confidential information from Firestone and Goodyear in the Fleenor case while
he was a member of G&D. \35
The federal district court judge refused to disqualify Murry and ruled
that Goodyear and Firestone were not clients ofG&D because members
of a joint defense group are not clients of another joint member's
attorney.136 Only Tocco's consent was required for a valid waiver under
the disciplinary rules.137 Additionally, an irrebuttable presumption of
shared confidential communications was inappropriate because Firestone
and Goodyear were not clients ofG&D, and an irrebuttable presumption
only applied when an attorney-client relationship developed. 138 Support·
for this position was found in the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Fred Weber,
Inc., which the judge viewed as "virtually identical to the question facing
this COurt.,,139 Finally, no evidence existed in support ofthe proposition

128

!d.

Turner, 896 F. Supp. at 652.
130 Id. at 653.
\31 Id. at 652.
\32 !d. at 653.
\33 !d.
129

134

TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Turner, 896 F. Supp. at 653.
136 Id. at 654.
\31 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
135

1.06 & 1.09.
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that Murry actually received any confidential information from or about
Firestone or Goodyear. 140
Two important items are worth noting. First, the judge clearly rejected
the position that joint defense members are clients of the attorney for
another joint defense member. 141 Second, the judge was not troubled by
the seemingly quid pro quo nature ofthe prejudicial dismissal of Tocco
after Tocco's waiver of conflict. 142
Insurance Co. a/North America v. Puerto Rico Marine Management,
Inc. 143 presents a different variation ofthe same theme found in the cases
previously discussed. Carl Coste sustained a work related injury and sued
Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc., Klinge Corp., and Copeland
COrp.l44 During the trial, Copeland was dismissed with prejUdice by the
plaintiff. 14s Shortly thereafter, a mistrial occurred as a result of Coste
falling while leaving the witness stand. 146 Before a second trial could be
held, Marine Management sought to retain Copeland's former lawyer for
the upcoming trial. 147 Insurance Co. of North America (INA), Coste's
insurance carrier, objected to Marine Management's motion to substitute
Copeland's former counsel because after Copeland had been dismissed
as a defendant, Copeland's counsel and Copeland's expert witness met
with INA's counsel. I48 An allegation was put forth that during this
meeting INA's counsel disclosed confidential information to Copeland's
attorney. 149 In response to Marine Management's defense that no
confidential information had been exchanged, the plaintiff filed affidavits
indicating that Copeland's counsel and expert witness met with INA's
counsel to discuss the expert's potential testimony and problems with it. ISO

140 Turner, 896 F. Supp. at 654.
141 [d.
142Id.
143 903 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. La. 1995).
144 Insurance Co. o/N. Am., 903 F. Supp. at 1005.
145 !d.
146 !d.
147 !d.
148Id.

149 Insurance Co. o/N. Am., 903 F. Supp. at 1005.
150 !d. at 1006.
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The federal district judge first stated that Marine Management's
conclusory, general statements that no confidential information had been
disclosed were insufficient in light of plaintiff s detailed affidavit setting
forth what had transpired at the meeting. lSI The judge thus found that
confidential information was disclosed. In response to Marine Management's argument that Copeland's former lawyer never signed an
agreement with Marine Management not to assist the other defendants,
the district judge ruled that such an agreement was "inconsequential" to
the disqualification issue. IS2 Relying on Wilson P. Abraham Construction
Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., IS3 the judge ruled that regardless of the
absence of an agreement not to assist any other defendant, Copeland's
former attorney had a fiduciary duty to not use confidential information
received from plaintiff. ls4 The court therefore refused to permit Marine
Management to substitute Copeland's former counsel as its own
counsel. ISS
The next relevant case, GTE North, Inc. v. Apache Products CO.,IS6
involved a cost recovery action under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of1980 (CERCLA)ls7 by GTE
North, Inc. against five defendants, one of which was Dean Foods Co.
GTE sought to disqualify Dean Foods's counsel, Jon Faletto, and his firm
of Howard & Howard (H&H).158
In 1989, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
issued notification of Potentially Responsible Party (PRP) status to
various companies for possible liability under CERCLA ls9 Five of the
companies notified ofPRP status formed the Appleton Road Committee
and executed ajoint remedial cost sharing agreement that allocated each
member's share ofthe response cost. 160 Members ofthis committee also

ISIId.
IS2Id.

559 F.2d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 1977).
154 Insurance Co. olN. Am., 903 F. Supp. at 1006.
ISS Id. at 1007.
IS6 914 F. Supp. 1575 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
IS742 V.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (West 1995).
IS8 GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1577.
IS9 !d.
IS3

160 Id.
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agreed to cooperate in investigating and identifying additional PRPS. 161
Also part ofthe agreement was that all infonnation would be held in strict
confidence among the members, and that no member would take any civil
action against any other member. 162 Two ofthe members ofthe Appleton
Road Committee were Chrysler Corporation and GTE. 163 Some members
ofthe Appleton Road Committee agreed to a second agreement concerning the joint investigation of additional PRPS. I64 Chrysler and GTE
signed this second joint agreement. 165 During this period, Jon Faletto of
the H&H law finn represented Chrysler. 166
As a result ofthe joint investigatory effort, infonnation was gathered
and disseminated regarding the legal merit of possible lawsuits against
other PRPs, one of which was Dean Foods. 167 At the conclusion of the
joint investigation, Chrsyler decided not to participate in any litigation
for cost recovery against PRPs identified by the joint investigation. 168
However, GTE and some other members of the joint agreement, on the
other hand, decided to pursue cost recovery litigation against other PRPs,
including Dean Foods. 169 Dean Foods then hired Faletto, Chrysler's
fonner counsel, as its own counsel. 170 Chrysler gave Faletto its pennission for him and his finn to represent Dean Foods. 171 GTE, however,
filed a motion to disqualify Faletto and H&H claiming that Faletto owed
GTE a fiduciary duty to maintain its confidences based on an implied
attorney-client relationship. 172 This implied attorney-client relationship
arose from the "peculiar relationship between the members ofthe Cost
Recovery Committee and the circumstances under which confidential

!d.
162 [d.
161

GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1577.
[d. at 1577-78.
165 !d.
163

164

166
167

!d. at 1578.
[d.

GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1578.
[d.
170 !d.
171 [d.

168
169

172

!d.
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information was disclosed. ,,173 GTE emphasized in support of its position
the express confidentiality provisions in the two agreements, and the fact
that confidential information and legal strategy had been freely exchanged
between the companies and their attorneys.174 Faletto and H&H contended that, in order for an implied attorney-client relationship to exist,
GTE must show that it supplied information to Faletto with the reasonable
belief that Faletto was acting as GTE's attorney.175
The federal district judge evaluated the disqualification issue under
Rule 1.9 regarding former client-conflict of interese 76 and Rule 1.10
regarding law firm disqualification,177 of the Rules of Professional
Conduct for the Northern District of Illinois. 178 The judge first discussed
whether GTE satisfied the threshold requirement ofbeing a former client
for purposes of Rule 1.9. 179 Because GTE obviously never shared an
express attorney-client relationship with Faletto or H&H, the issue
became "whether some sort offiduciaryrelationship arose between them
that would make GTE a 'former client'" of Faletto and H&H.180
Regarding this point, the judge looked to Westinghouse Electric Corp.
v. Kerr-McGee Corp., decided by the Seventh Circuit. 181 Westinghouse
involved a law firm's representation of a trade association and the receipt
of confidential information from the trade association's members. 182 The
district judge cited Westinghouse to support the proposition "that a
'fiduciary relationship [on a lawyer's part] may result because of the
nature ofthe work performed and the circumstances under which [the]
confidential information is divulged. ",183 In the GTE case, because

174

GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1578.
[d.

175

[d.

173

[d. at 1578-79.
177 [d.
176

GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1578-79.
179 [d. at 1579.
180 [d.
178

181 [d. (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978)).
182 Westinghouse, 580 F.2d at 1313.
183 GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1580 (quoting Westinghouse, 580 F.2d at 1319).
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counsel for each joint defense member freely discussed investigation
results, strategy, and the merits of cases against additional PRP's,
including Dean Foods, a fiduciary relationship existed between GTE and
Faletto. 184 This duty occurred because information collected by GTE was
jointly shared, discussed, and disseminated as part of a joint defense. 185
Therefore, GTE had the right to seek Faletto' s disqualification under Rule
1.9.
When the court applied Rule 1.9 to the situation where no direct or
express attorney-client relationship existed, it believed that no presumption of shared confidences was appropriate. 186 The court required a
showing that the attorney subject to the disqualification motion was
actually privy to confidential information. 187 The undisputed facts as
presented to the court proved that confidential information had been
exchanged. 188 Therefore, F aletto' s representation ofDean Foods violated
Rule 1.9, and this violation required his disqualification. 189 In regard to
the disqualification of Faletto's law firm, H&H, the court found an
irrebuttable presumption that Faletto shared confidences with others in
the law firm.190 Thus, Rule 1.10 required disqualification of the entire
firm. 191
This district court opinion was important in two respects. First, the
judge believed that in order to disqualify Faletto, it must decide whether
GTE was a "former client" of Faletto.192 Second, the court applied an
irrebuttable presumption of shared confidences to vicariously disqualify
Faletto's entire law firm. 193

184

18S
186

187

[d. at 1581.
[d.

[d. at 1580.
!d.

GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1581.
!d.
190 !d.

188

189

191 Id. This waS so even though Illinois follows a minority approach and permits
screening when the law ftrm is not switching sides. See Analytica, Inc. v. NPD
Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983).
192 GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1578-80.
193 !d. at 1581.
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The next significant case involving a disqualification motion resulting
from a joint defense agreement was National Medical Enterprises Inc.
v. Godbey, a decision by the Texas Supreme Court. 194 National Medical
Enterprises (NME) and others had been targets of a criminal investigation
and various related civil lawsuits involving allegations of mistreatment
ofpatients and the defrauding of insurance companies in connection with
the operation ofmore than seventy psychiatric hospitals across the United
States. 195 Employees and former employees ofNME also faced possible
personal liability for their conduct on behalf ofNME. 196 NME agreed
to retain independent counsel to represent these employees. 197 NME hired
Ed Tomko, an attorney with the law firm ofDoke & Riley (but who later
joined the law firm of Baker & Botts), to represent one of its employees,
Ronald Cronen. 198 Cronen was a target ofthe grandjury investigation. 199
Tomko advised Cronen on various matters relating to the criminal
investigation and discovery in the civil actions. 20o Although Cronen was
never indicted by the grand jury, he was named as a defendant in over
thirty civil cases. 201 In every civil case, however, the claims against him
were dismissed with no finding ofliability.202
Tomko was retained by NME to provide legal advice to James Wicoff,
another NME employee who was also a target of a grand jury investigation and a defendant in numerous civil suits. 203 Like Cronen; Wicoff was
never indicted or held liable in any ofthe civil cases. 204 Tomko's joint
representation of Cronen and Wicofflasted about one year. 205 During the
first seven months of his joint representation, Tomko was at Doke &

194

924 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. 1996).
195 Godbey, 924 S.W.2d at 124.
196 [d.
197 [d.
198 [d.
199 [d.
200

Godbey, 924 S.W.2d at 124.

Jd.
202 [d.
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[d. at 125.
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Riley and billed approximately $18,000. 206 The last five months of the
joint representation were while Tomko was with Baker & Botts; the
billing for this period was only about $700. 207 NME paid these bills.208
Tomko received confidential communications from Cronen and Wicoff,
as well as from NME (which was separately represented by counsel).209
Tomko's discussions with NME were subject to a written joint defense
agreement which Tomko and Wicoff signed and Cronen and NME
acknowledged applied to them.21O The agreement protected disclosures
to any third party, but reserved the right of each member to take action
against any other member. 2l1 This agreement also provided that each
client understood that only its own attorney represented it, and that an
attorney owed a duty ofloyalty to his own client only.212
Shortly after the joint defense agreement was executed, Tomko and
Baker & Botts withdrew from representing Cronen and Wicoff for reasons

206ld.
2071d.
2081d. at 124.
209 ld. at 125.
210 Godbey, 924 S.W.2d at 125.
2111d.
212

The agreement in relevant part read:

1. Unless expressly stated in writing to the contrary, any communications between
or among any of the client members and/or the attorney members concerning the
[investigations and litigation involving NME] are confidential and are protected
from disclosure to any third party by the joint defense privilege, the attorney-client
privilege and the work product doctrine.
3. None of the information obtained by any client member or attorney member
pursuant to this agreement shall be disclosed to any third party without the consent
of the attorney member who disclosed the information in the first instance.
6. Each client member understands and acknowledges ... that he or she is represented only by his or her own attorney in this matter; that while the attorneys
representing the other members have a duty to preserve the confidences disclosed
to them pursuant to this agreement, they will not be acting as his or her attorney in
this matter; and that the attorney representing the other client members will owe a
duty ofloyaJty to their own respective clients only. Each client member further
understands and acknowledges that the attorney members representing other client
members have the right, and may well have the obligation, to take actions against
his or her own interest. ...

Godbey, 924 S.W.2d at 125.
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unrelated to the issue in the present case.213 About seventeen months
later, lawyers at Baker & Botts who had not been involved in the prior
representation of Cronen and Wicoff sued NME on behalf of a large
number of former patients at NME hospitals. 214 The lawsuit was based
on grounds similar to the eaflier cases.215 Neither Cronen or Wicoffwere
named as defendants in these civil suits, although Cronen's immediate
predecessor as regional administrator for NME was named as a
defendant. 216 NME moved to disqualify Baker & BottS.217 The trial judge
denied NME' s motion.218 He ruled that Baker & Botts could be disqualified only if it had actually represented NME, if Baker & Botts owed a
duty ofloyalty to NME based on its representation of Cronen and Wicoff
or based on the joint defense agreement, or ifBaker & Botts was actually
misusing NME's confidences. 219 Because the trial judge found none of
these circumstances to have been established, NME's motion was
denied. 220
The Texas Supreme Court reversed and ordered the disqualification
ofBaker & Botts. 221 The court first recognized that the present action was
substantially related to the earlier representation involving Cronen and
Wicoff. 222 If Tomko had represented NME in the earlier action, then
Baker & Botts would clearly be disqualified in this case. However, the
court held that Tomko had not represented NME either by his representation of Cronen and Wicoff or by virtue ofthe joint defense agreement.223

Godbey, 924 S.W.2d at 125.
[d. at 126.
215 !d.
216 !d.

213

214

217

!d. Cronen also filed his own motion seeking Baker & Botts' disqualification.

!d.
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Godbey, 924 S.W.2d at 126.
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[d.

220 [d. Cronen's motion was also denied because although this case was substantially related to Cronen's case, the trial judge ruled that this case was not adverse to
Cronen, and that it was not reasonably probable that Cronen's confidences would be
misused. [d. at 126-27.
221 !d.
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!d. at 129.
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The Court did find, however, that the joint defense agreement created a
duty for Tomko regarding non-clients. 224 Under the joint defense
agreement, Tomko had "strictly promised" not to disclose information
to third parties.225 Pursuant to the joint defense agreement, Tomko
admittedly had obtained confidential information from NME.226 Tomko
thus owed a duty of confidentiality to NME.227 Citing Wilson P. Abraham
Construction Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp.,228 the Texas Supreme Court
noted that, although the Fifth Circuit described the relationship between
the attorney and his client's co-counsel as "resembling an attorney-client
relationship," that "quasi-relationship" was not the basis of its decision. 229
Instead, the Fifth Circuit "based its disqualification analysis on a duty
to preserve confidences implied in the circumstances of a joint
defense.,,23o This case was somewhat easier to decide because Tomko
had expressly agreed to a duty of confidentiality; no implication of any
duty was required. The Texas Supreme Court also cited two decisions
from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit- Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee COrp.231 andAnalytica,
Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc. 232-for the proposition that disqualification can
be based on a duty to preserve confidences even when those confidences
are not those of a former client. Because Tomko could not personally
represent the new plaintiff group against NME without dishonoring his
obligations under the earlier j oint defense agreement, Tomko's disqualification was warranted. 233
Tomko, however, never intended to represent any ofthe new plaintiffs.
Only lawyers at Baker & Botts who were not involved in the earlier
representation were involved in the new case against NME. 234 The issue
[d.
225 [d.
226 !d.
227 [d.
224

228
229

559 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1977); see text supra notes 18-65.
Godbey, 924 S.W.2d at 130; see also Abraham Constr. Corp., 559 F.2d at 253.

230

[d.

231

580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978).

232

708 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983).
Godbey, 924 S.W.2d at 131-32.
234 !d. at 129.
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thus became whether every lawyer at Baker & Botts must be
disqualified. 235 The court first noted that ifNME had been an actual client
of Tomko, an irrebuttable presumption of shared confidences between
Tomko and all the lawyers at his firm would apply, thus vicariously
disqualifying the entire firm.236 However, no attorney-client relationship
existed between Tomko and NME. Based on the joint defense agreement,
the court nevertheless believed that the same irrebuttable presumption
should apply.237 This irrebuttable presumption was justified because an
"attorney's duty to preserve confidences shared under a joint defense
agreement is no less because the person to whom they belong was never
a client. The attorney's promise places him in the role of a fiduciary, the
same as toward a client.'>23S NME's motion to disqualify Baker & Botts
was granted, although no evidence supported the disclosure of information that Tomko received from NME to anyone at the firm.239
Two justices dissented on the issue ofBaker & Botts' disqualification
and emphasized that Tomko had not disclosed any confidential information from NME to any attorney at Baker & Botts. 24o Moreover, thejoint
defense agreement had expressly stated that Tomko owed no duty of
loyalty to NME, and that Tomko had the right to take action adverse to
NME.241 Therefore, adopting the irrebuttable presumption of shared
confidences was inappropriate. 242
Two points are most noteworthy in this case. First, despite the express
language of the joint defense agreement eschewing any duty of loyalty

235
236

[d. at 131.
[d.

Id. at 132.
Godbey, 924 S.W.2d at 132.
239 !d. In regard to Cronen's motion to disqualify Baker & Botts, the Texas Supreme
Court disagreed with the trial judge's conclusion that this case was not adverse to
Cronen. [d. at 133. The court said that adversity must be evaluated based on "the
likelihood of the risk and the seriousness of the consequences." [d. at 132. Even
though the likelihood of Cronen being harmed by the new lawsuit was small, the risk
involved was serious. [d. at 132-33. Moreover, the court believed that Cronen's
a..-uiety that he would be added as a defendant at some point in the new litigation was
relevant to a fmding that the new case was adverse to his interest. !d. at 133.
24°Id. at 135 (Baker, J., dissenting).
241 [d. at 136.
242Id. at 137.
237

238

1998]

JOINT DEFENSE AGREEMENTS

337

by an attorney for one member to another member ofthe agreement, the
confidentiality provision of the joint defense agreement provided an
adequate basis for Tomko's disqualification. 243 Second, despite holding
that no attorney-client relationship existed between Tomko and the joint
defense members who filed the disqualification motion, an irrebuttable
presumption of shared confidences was used to vicariously disqualify
every lawyer at Tomko's current law frrm.244
International Trust Corp. v. Pirtle, an unpublished opinion by the
Texas Court of Appeals (and thus not intended to be cited as authority),
involved ajoint defense but no writtenjoint defense agreement. 245 Again,
the issue was whether a non-client joint defense member could seek
disqualification of a former co-defendant' s attorney. 246 A limited partnership (77-2 Ltd.) was involved in this case and the general partner was a
corporation, Amarillo Equity Investors, Inc. (AEI), controlled by Dean
Lively.247 In 1994, Lively and AEI deeded land owned by 77-2 Ltd. to
International Trust Corporation (lTC), also controlled by Lively.248
Shortly after ITC received the property from 77-2 Ltd., ITC conveyed
it to Colonies Joint Venture (Colonies), a j oint venture comprised ofITC
and Anthony Saikowski. 249 The limited partners of77-2 Ltd. alleged that
the sale from 77-2 Ltd. to ITe was below fair market value, and that it
constituted a fraudulent conveyance and a breach of fiduciary duty owed
to them as limited partners. 250 The limited partners sued lTC, AEI,
Colonies, Lively and Saikowski. 251
On March 30, 1995, Saikowski, on his own behalf and on behalf of
Colonies, retained the law firm of Gamer, Lovell & Stem (GL&S).252
On April 20, 1995, Lively, who controlled ITC (the other joint venturer

243

Godbey, 924 S.W.2d at 132.
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1997 WL 20870 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 1997).
Pirtle, 1997 WL 20870, at ·4.
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in Colonies), wrote to Saikowski reminding him that under the Colonies
joint venture agreement, approval of both joint venturers was required
before counsel could be retained, and that ITC was not consenting to the
hiring of GL&S.253 On the same date, the law firm of Foster, Lewis,
Langley, Gardner & Banack (Foster) sent a letter on behalf of ITC to
GL&S reiterating lTC's objection to GL&S 's representation of Colonies,
and complaining that the answer filed by GL&S on behalf ofSaikowski
and Colonies "offered up ITC as a sacrificial lamb" in order to protect
Saikowski. 254 Shortly after sending this letter, however, Foster authorized
GL&S to file an amended answer on behalf of Colonies-subject to prior
approval by lTC's in-house attomey.255 In September, 1995, disputes
arose between ITC and Saikowski over their joint venture agreement. 256
In October 1995, GL&S wrote Lively, on behalf of Saikowski and
Colonies, that lTC's status as a joint venturer was terminated. 257 In
February 1996, ITC made a formal demand for arbitration. 258 GL&S filed
a response and counterclaim on behalf of Saikowski and Colonies.259
One issue presented was whether GL&S should be disqualified from
representing Colonies and Saikowski in the arbitration proceeding. 260 ITC
contended that disqualification was required based upon fiduciary duties
owed to a non-client co-defendant who participated in the joint defense
ofthe 77 -2 Ltd. limited partners' case, and because ofthe appearance of
impropriety ifGL&S was not disqualified. 261 In response to this motion,
a contention was raised that no substantial relationship existed between
the joint defense in the prior litigation and the subject matter of the
arbitration and claims against Lively and AEI. 262
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256 Pirtle, 1997 WL 20870, at *3 (disputes involving, inter alia, responsibility for
development costs, and Saikowski's performance as managing venturer).
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The Texas Court ofAppeals first ruled that the substantial relationship
test was not the only test that governed the decision whether to disqualify
an attorney.263 It next held that, though no fonnal attorney-client
relationship existed between ITC and GL&S, because ITC and GL&S
participated in a joint defense in the original 77-2 Ltd. lawsuit, GL&S
had a duty to preserve any confidences exchanged as part of the joint
defense. 264 Even absent an attorney-client relationship and even absent
ajoint defense agreement, the court held that a fiduciary duty is owed to
a non-client co-defendant who participated in a joint defense. 265
Citing Rio Hondo Implement Co. v. Euresti/66 the Pirtle court said that
the relevant inquiry in deciding the disqualification motion before it was
threefold: (1) was there a prior joint defense; (2) was confidential
infonnation shared; and (3) was the matter in which the confidential
infonnation was shared substantially related to the matter in which
disqualification is sought. 267 Ajoint defense existed in this case. Though
ITC never gave its written consent to the hiring of GL&S on behalf of
the joint venture-and even objected to GL&S's representation-GL&S
was never discharged, and ITC consented to GL&S filing an amended
answer and seeking a settlement on lTC's behalf. 268 lTC's own attorney
also conferred with GL&S about various issues in the defense ofthe case
brought by the limited partners. 269 In regard to the requirement that
confidential infonnation must have been disclosed by ITC to GL&S in
order for the court to disqualify GL&S, the court stated that, "[w ]hile our
detennination that there was a joint defense may replace the need to
establish an attorney-client relationship, it does not obviate the necessity
to show that confidential infonnation was disclosed.'mo ITC then argued
that "a party seeking disqualification is not required to establish exactly
what confidences were shared with the attorney whose disqualification

263

264
265

!d.

Id. at *10.
!d. at * II.

903 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. App. 1995).
267 Pirtle, 1997 WL 20870 at *11 (citing Rio Hondo, 903 S.W.2d at 132).
268 !d. at * II.
269Id.
266

27°Id. at *12.
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is sought.,,271 The court rejected this argument and found that ITe had
not shown that it had disclosed confidential infonnation to GL&S.272
Next, to satisfy the substantial relationship aspect ofthe disqualification
analysis, the court stated that the party seeking disqualification "must
prove that the facts of the previous representation are so related to the
facts in the present litigation that a genuine threat exists that confidences
revealed to the former counsel will be divulged to a pre~ent adversary.,,273
In this case, no substantial relationship occurred between the two matters;
therefore, disqualification of GL&S was denied. 274 Finally, the court
rejected the contention that the appearance of impropriety was an
"independent ground of disqualification," although the court said it "may
be a factor to consider in a disqualification analysis.,,275 The court gave
no hint of what it meant by this.
This case is noteworthy for a few reasons. Although the court could
have easily concluded that an attorney-client relationship actually existed
between ITC and GL&S in that ITC was a joint venturer ofGL&S' s client
(the joint venture), the court instead emphasized the duty owed by an
attorney to a non-client. 276 Second, the court found a duty owed based
on a joint defense-even absent ajoint defense agreement.277 Third, the
moving party had the burden ofproving that confidential information had
been disclosed. 278 Fourth, the court seemed to require not only proof of
the exchange of confidential information, but also that the prior matter
that involved a joint defense was substantially related to the matter in
which disqualification was sought.279 Finally, the court rejected appear

271

!d. at *11.

272
273

Pirtle, 1997 WL 20870, at *12.
[d. at * 13.

274

!d.

275

[d.

276

!d. at *10.

277

Pirtle, 1997 WL 20870, at * 11.

278

[d.

279 [d. at *12. The court's opinion is confusing here. At one point, the court noted
that proof of substantial relationship replaces the need to prove exchange ofconfidential
information "where the trial court is asked to disqualify an attorney because his current
representation involves his former representation of a client on a substantially related
matter". [d. The court continued this irrebuttable presumption of shared confidences
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ance of impropriety as an independent basis to grant a disqualification
motion. 280
The federal district court for New Jersey decided the most recent case
relevant to this Article-Essex Chemical Corp. v. Hartford Accident &
Indemnity CO. 281 In 1988, Essex Chemical Corp. (Essex) was the target
of a hostile takeover. 282 Essex retained the law finn of Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meagher and Flom (Skadden) to defend it in the takeover
attempt. 283 Skadden arranged for a white knight, Dow Chemical Co., to
acquire Essex, thus defeating the hostile takeover?84 Skadden represented
Essex in the acquisition negotiations and subsequent litigation.285 In
1993, Essex brought suit based upon environmental claims arising from
contamination at Essex properties, and one of the defendants was The
Home Insurance Co., one ofEssex' s insurers.286 Home Insurance retained
Skadden in this matter. 287 In 1996, the defendants in Essex's environmental case executed a joint defense agreement to manage the litigation,
including the coordination of discovery?88 Subsequent to this agreement,
and during discovery, Essex filed a motion to disqualifY Skadden from

discussion in the next paragraph, never noting in this context that it had already held
that ITC was never a client of GL&S. /d. at * 13. Therefore, this irrebuttable presumption was inapplicable. Id. at *14. The court never directly stated that when the moving
party never had an attorney-client relationship with the target of the disqualification
motion that an irrebuttable presumption was not appropriate. When the court set forth
its three part test, however, the confidential information requirement was joined to the
substantial relationship requirement by an "and" not an "or." /d. at * 11. On the other
hand, earlier in its opinion, the court disagreed with the position that substantial
relationship is a "necessary element of proof on all disqualification theories except
suing a current client." /d. at *6.
28°Id. at *13.
281 993 F. Supp. 241 (D. N.J. 1998), rev'g, 975 F. Supp. 650 (D. N.J. 1998)
(magistrate's opinion); see, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Conflicts o/Interest in Legal Representation: Should the Appearance o/Impropriety Rule Be Eliminated in NewJersey-or
Revived Everywhere Else?, 28 SETON HALL L. REv. 315 (1997).
282 Essex Chern., 993 F. Supp. at 243.
283 /d. at 244.
284 Id.
285Id.
286Id.

287 Essex Chern., 993 F. Supp. at 244.
288/d.
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representing Home Insurance and to disqualify the attorneys for the other
defendants who were also members ofthe joint defense agreement with
Home Instirance. 289 Skadden immediately voluntarily withdrew its
appearance on behalf of Home Insurance; however, the attorneys for the
other defendants opposed Essex's motion. 290
The disqualification motion was first ruled upon by a magistrate who,
without holding a hearing, disqualified attorneys for all the defendants
who were members of the joint defense agreement. 291 The magistrate first
found that "Skadden's participation in the joint defense group created a
risk that the confidential information acquired by Skadden during the
former representation may be used to the detriment of Essex.,,292 The
magistrate then applied an irrebuttable presumption that Skadden had
shared this confidential information with the other members ofthe Joint
Defense Agreement. 293 Defense counsels' certifications that no confidential information had been shared were irrelevant. 294 The magistrate further
reasoned that "defendants' participation in the Joint Defense Agreement,
together with Skadden's former representation of Essex, gave rise to an
implied attorney-client relationship between Essex and all defense
counsel.,,295 Based upon this implied attorney-client relationship, another
irrebuttable presumption of shared confidences applied to all defense
counsel. 296 The magistrate also found that disqualification ofthe attorneys
for all the members ofthe j oint defense agreement was appropriate under
New Jersey's Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9(b), which prohibits
conduct that creates an "appearance ofimpropriety.,,297
A federal district court judge reviewed the disqualification motion and
strongly disagreed with the magistrate?98 The judge noted that "[t]he

289

!d.

290

[d. at 241.
!d. at 244-45.

291

Essex Chern., 993 F. Supp. at 244.
[d. at 244-45.
294 [d. at 245.
292

293

295
296
297

298

[d. (emphasis added).
[d.

Essex Chern., 993 F. Supp. at 244-45.
[d. at 245-55.
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parties have not cited, and the Court's research has not yielded, any
controlling or even persuasive authority directly on point.,,299 The federal
district judge then ruled that an irrebuttable presumption of shared
confidences amongjoint defense lawyers should not be applied. 3°O Only
if Skadden had actually disclosed confidential information to the other
joint defense members would disqualification of all defendants' attorneys
be required. 301 Because the magistrate did not hold a hearing, a remand
was necessary on the issue regarding whether actual disclosure had
occurred. 302 Additionally, the district judge ruled that the magistrate erred
in implying an attorney-client relationship between Essex and counsel
for all the members ofthe joint defense groUp.303 In this case, an implied
attorney-client relationship was "contrary to law and unsupported by the
record. ,,304 Because the record did not contain the joint defense agreement, one could not refer to the factors relevant to an implied attorney-client relationship, such as the "defendants' and counsel's intent,
[and] the extent and nature of counsels' interaction.,,305 Nor did any case
support the proposition that a "collaborative counsel relationship renders
a participating attorney implied counsel for the former client of a
collaborating attorney. ,,306

III. Issues to Be Addressed by the Courts
This Article has set forth the analysis of cases that have attempted to
resolve the issues relevant to the disqualification of attorneys involved

!d. at 246.
!d. at 25t.
301 [d. at 251-52.
299

300

302 Essex Chern., 993 F. Supp. at 252. A remand was also necessary on the appearance of impropriety issue because the magistrate had not considered the relevant facts,
and had incorrectly relied upon a presumption of shared confidences in concluding that
an ordinary citizen would fmd an appearance of impropriety in defense counsels' of
the other joint defense members continuing to represent Essex's claim. [d. at 254.
303 !d. at 253.
304 [d.
30S [d.
306

!d.
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injoint defense agreements. Unfortunately, the opinions are not always
easily understood. However, one point is clear, no generally accepted
analysis ofthis disqualification issue has occurred. The remainder ofthis
Article attempts to develop a coherent approach based on the recurring
issues that have been addressed in these past cases.
A threshold issue is whether an attorney for one member of the joint
defense effort owes any duty to another member ofthe j oint defense who
has not shared an express attorney-client relationship. Courts have
recognized some duty based either on an implied attorney-client relationship theory or upon a duty arising out of the joint defense. The better
approach to this issue is to eschew an analysis that relies on creating an
attorney-relationship in favor of recognizing that any duty owed by an
attorney for one joint defense member to another joint defense member
springs independently from the attorney's participation in the joint
defense. The reason for this conclusion is that the implied attorney-client
relationship model is based on a misunderstanding of the relationship
between members of a joint defense and their attorneys. One rationale
for the implied attorney-client relationship approach is the analogy
between joint defense members and multiple clients of one lawyer.
However, this analogy is faulty.307 Joint defense defendants do not share
the "unity of interest" that multiple clients of one lawyer share. 308
Separate attorneys are often retained by joint defense members to "avoid
the pitfalls of multiple representation. ,,309 Also, one should not analogize
. joint defense members to trade association members. Trade association
members communicate directly to the trade association's attorneys. Joint
defense members usually do not communicate directly with attorneys for
other joint defense members. 310 Moreover, the degree ofunity of interest
among joint defense members is different than among trade association
members. 311 The "legal fate" of one joint defense member "has no

?07 See Rushing, supra note 2, at 1273; Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d
602 (8th Cir. 1977).
308 Bartel, supra note 4, at 876.
309 Forsgren, supra note 16, at 1219.
310 See generally Bartel, supra note 4, at 875-918.
311 [d. at 876-79.
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necessary impact upon any other co-defendant," unlike the trade association situation.312
Unlike multiple clients and trade association members, joint defense
members do not share a relationship of trust; rather the joint defense
agreement is often required from a relationship of mistrust and lack of
confidence. Moreover, the expectations of each member of the joint
defense agreement differ from that ofmultiple clients or trade association
members. Joint defense members, for example, fully expect that they may
be cross-examined by attorneys representing other joint members. 313
Importantly, j oint defense members realistically expect loyalty only from
their own lawyer, not from the attorneys ofotherjointmembers. 314 Joint
defense members therefore should not be considered the clients of other
j oint defense members' attorneys. In this regard, one commentator stated
that those courts that have held that joint defense members do have an
attorney-client relationship with other members' attorneys are "engaged
more in hyperbole than in thoughtful analysis.,,31S Because the duty owed
by an attorney in a joint defense situation is a duty based on the joint
defense itself, the proper threshold issue, therefore, is not whether the
record establishes that an attorney-client relationship existed by implication but whether a joint defense has been proven between the party
seeking disqualification and the former client ofthe attorney who is the
target of the disqualification motion.
Because the attorney's duty is defined based on participation in a joint
defense, and not dependent on any attorney-client relationship, consent
by the attorney's actual former client becomes irrelevant to a disqualification motion filed by a non-client, former, co-joint defense member. This
position avoids the need to resolve another ethical issue-the propriety of
a new client who is asked to forego suit against a former client ofthe new
client's attorney (when the former client was part of an earlier joint

312Id.

at 878.

See generally Forsgren, supra note 16, at 1251 n.134.
See generally Bartel, supra note 4, at 878.
315Id. at 901; see, e.g., Ageloffv. Noranda, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 72 (D. R.I. 1996)
(ruling that an attorney-client relationship would not be implied because the dispute
was between members of the joint defense agreement, but that an attorney-client
relationship would be implied if a third party's rights were involved).
313

314
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defense) as bartered to obtain the fonner client's consentto the attorney's
new representation. 316
Once the relevant threshold issue is accepted to be whether a joint
defense existed, the next issue is what needs to be proven to establish a
joint defense that could fonn the basis of the disqualification motion.
Often joint defense members draft written joint defense agreements
setting forth the rights and obligations of the members and their
attorneys.3\7 If these agreements include clauses that provide that all
infonnation shared among the members and their attorneys relating to
the joint defense can be used only for purposes ofthe joint defense, and
that no attorney can use any infonnation obtained pursuant to the joint
defense agreement on behalf of any client other than the joint defense
member client, clearly a duty has been imposed upon the attorney, which
will inure to the benefit of all joint defense members. In such a situation,
an attorney could be properly disqualified in a subsequent case based on
a motion filed by a joint defense member different than that attorney's
client.
More problematic is when no express joint defense agreement exists
regarding confidentiality and subsequent use of joint defense
infonnation. 318 This author suggests that it should be more difficult for
a disqualification motion to be granted when the motion is filed by a joint
defense member against the attorney for another defense member if no
express joint defense agreement occurred.
The next issues to be resolved involve matters regarding burden of
proof and presumption of shared confidences. When a fonner client is
seeking disqualification of its attorney in a substantially related matter,
no need arises for the fonner client to prove that confidential infonnation
was actually given to the attorney. Nor is the attorney, who is the target
of the disqualification motion, allowed to defend by proving that
confidential infonnation was not disclosed. Regarding the fonner client,
substantially related matter situation, there is an irrebuttable presumption

316 See, e.g, Turner v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 896 F. Supp. 651 (E.D. Tex.
1995).
317 See, e.g. ,joint defense agreement, supra note 123; GTE N., Inc. v. Apache Prods.
Co., 914 F. Supp. 1575, 1577-78 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
318 See, e.g., International Trust Corp. v. Pirtle, 1997 WL 20870 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan.
17,1997).
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that confidential information was disclosed. Such an irrebuttable
presumption should be rejected in the situation where a member of a joint
defense is seeking disqualification of another member's attorney in a
subsequent matter. No attorney-client relationship exists between the
party moving for disqualification and the target attorney. Nor does the
attorney owe any duty of loyalty to this member of the former joint
defense. The duty imposed by a joint defense arises solely out of the
possession of confidential information. Moreover, because joint defense
members are not as forthcoming wi th information for other j oint defense
members as they would be with their own attorneys, an irrebuttable
presumption does not appear to be appropriate.
The next issue thus becomes whether a rebuttable presumption of
disclosed confidential information is appropriate. Ifthis is true, the party
moving for disqualification would meet its burden by proving merely that
a joint defense (and perhaps a j oint defense agreement) existed. To avoid
disqualification, the attorney subject to the disqualification motion would
then have the burden of proving that he had not received confidential
information from the moving party. An alternate approach would be to
put the burden on the moving party not only to prove the existence of a
joint defense or joint defense agreement, but also to prove that it had
given confidential information to the attorney it is now seeking to
disqualify. Under this alternate approach, ifthe moving party met these
two burdens, the attorney, to avoid disqualification, would then need to
convince the fact finder that he had not received confidential information. 319
In deciding whether the "rebuttable presumption" approach or the
"burden on the moving party" approach is more desirable, this author
submits it is relevant whether an express joint defense agreement with
a confidentiality provision exists. If an express agreement exists, the
rebuttable presumption approach should be used. On the other hand, if
no express joint defense agreement exists (only a joint defense among
joint defendants), the burden should be placed on the moving party to
prove that confidential information was given to the attorney whose
disqualification is now being sought.
The next issue in deciding whether the disqualification motion should
be granted is whether the confidential information that was disclosed as

319

Under either alternative, in-camera presentation would be appropriate.
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part ofthe joint defense or joint defense agreement should be substantially
related to the subsequent action in which disqualification is sought. This
author submits that the answer to this question should be yes. The
accepted law today is that an attorney will only be disqualified in a
subsequent action based on a motion by an actual former client if the
subsequent action is substantially related to the attorney's prior representation ofthat client. Considering that joint defense members do not have
an attorney-client relationship with other joint defense members, the
requisite proof for a disqualification motion brought by a non-client joint
defense member should be at least as burdensome as required when a
former client files such a motion. Moreover, a substantial relationship
requirement avoids the situation where an attorney is locked into being
either a plaintiffs or defendant's lawyer. For example, assume that
Attorney A represented Defendant A in an asbestos personal injury matter
brought by Plaintiff X against ten asbestos manufacturers, and that a joint
defense agreement was entered into among all the defendants. Under this
author's proposal, in subsequent years, Attorney A would be disqualified
from representing PlaintiffY in an action against any member of earlier
joint defense agreement only if the cases were substantially related.
Absent a substantial relationship requirement, Attorney A, having
defended one asbestos defendant, which was part of a joint defense
agreement, would be precluded forever from representing any plaintiff
against any asbestos defendant (assuming some confidential information
had been disclosed as part of the joint defense).
Assuming that the former j oint defense member's motion to disqualify
the attorney of its former joint defense member is granted, the next issue
involves the disqualification of other members of the disqualified
attorney's law firm. The current majority position is that when an
individual attorney is disqualified based on a motion by a current or
former client, an irrebuttable presumption exists that the attorney whose
earlier representation led to his individual disqualification shared
confidential information with the other attorneys in his law firm, and thus
every attorney at the law firm is disqualified. A minority position creates
a rebuttable presumption of shared confidences, and thus permits the other
law firm members to avoid disqualification ifthe firm members can prove
that confidential information was not shared. This author's conclusion
is that in the joint defense situation where a motion to disqualify is being
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filed by a non-client, an irrebuttable presumption of shared confidences
with other members ofthe law firm is not appropriate. The closer issue
is whether even a rebuttable presumption is appropriate that would require
the law firm to prove adequate screening mechanisms and that confidential information had not been disclosed from the tainted lawyer to others,
or whether the burden should be placed on the moving party to prove that
confidential information had been disclosed. Because the duty owed to
a non-client member of a joint defense should not be equated to the duty
owed to a former client, the better approach would be to require the
non-client moving party who seeks to disqualify all members of a law
firm to havethe burden of establishing that confidential information had
been disclosed to members ofthe law firm. A similar analysis should be
applied when the motion seeks disqualification ofcounsel for all members
of a subsequent joint defense such as the situation in Essex Chemical
Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. 320
As a final point, the appearance of impropriety standard should not
be used to evaluate disqualification motions filed by non-client former
joint defense members. Appearance of impropriety is too vague to
provide a meaningful standard. To the extent it has been defined with
reference to the public's perspective ofthe impropriety ofthe situation,32\
it overlooks the complexities involved in defining a lawyer's duty to a
non-client, and the obligations among joint defense members and their
attorneys.

IV. Conclusion
In recent years, courts have struggled when ruling on motions seeking
to disqualify an attorney that are filed not by that attorney's former client,
but by the attorney's former client's former joint defense members. The
courts have not accepted a single approach to decide this issue. This
author, after reviewing and analyzing the cases on this issue, proposes
an analysis that incorporates the issues and concerns discussed by the

32°993 F. Supp. 241 (D. N.1. 1998), rev'g975 F. Supp. 650 (D. N.J. 1998)(magistrate's opinion).
321 See, e.g., Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602,609 (8th Cir. 1977);
Green, supra note 281, at 315.
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cases. Hopefully, the analysis will simplify the resolution of the issue
in future cases, and will help litigants and attorneys better evaluate the
benefits and risks of involvement in joint defenses.

